# ASU CR Cards Round 5

## 1NC

### 1

#### A. Interpretation and violation - the affirmative should have to instrumentally defend the institutional implementation of a topical plan.

#### Most predictable—the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical government action

Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### B. Reasons to prefer

#### 1. Fairness - Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)

**Debate as a dialogue** sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. **The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements**. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ **Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative**. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.’s¶ **When** one side takes more than its share, **competitive equity suffers**. **However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it** fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). **A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a** fundamental condition of a dialoguethat takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness** is a demand for respect**, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking** not be silenced.¶ **Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue.** **They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ **Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions**. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because **it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions** (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains** equality for the sake of the conversation(Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, **a**n affirmative **case** on the 2007-2008 college topic **might defend neither state nor** international **action** in the Middle East, andyet claim to be germane to the topic **in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions** in the international arena **are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative** subverts any meaningful role to the negative team**, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts.** Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits **of topical advocacy**.

#### 2. Substantive regulations that demarcate limits are necessary for dialogue---refusal to tailor their identity claims to normative, public stances shuts down the possibility for discussion and democratic respect

John Dryzek 6, Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National University, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 634–649

A more radical contemporary pluralism is suspicious of liberal and communitarian devices for reconciling difference. Such a critical pluralism is associated with agonists such as Connolly (1991), Honig (1993), and Mouffe (2000), and difference democrats such as Young (2000). As Honig puts it, “Difference is just another word for what used to be called pluralism” (1996, 60). Critical pluralists resemble liberals in that they begin from the variety of ways it is possible to experience the world, but stress that the experiences and perspectives of marginalized and oppressed groups are likely to be very different from dominant groups. They also have a strong suspicion ofliberal theory that looks neutral but in practice supports and serves the powerful. Difference democrats are hostile to consensus, partly because consensus decisionmaking (of the sort popular in 1970s radical groups) conceals informal oppression under the guise of concern for all by disallowing dissent (Zablocki 1980). But the real target is political theory that deploys consensus, especially deliberative and liberal theory. Young (1996, 125–26) argues that the appeals to unity and the common good that deliberative theorists under sway of the consensus ideal stress as the proper forms of political communication can often be oppressive. For deliberation so oriented all too easily equates the common good with the interests of the more powerful, thus sidelining legitimate concerns of the marginalized. Asking the underprivileged to set aside their particularistic concerns also means marginalizing their favored forms of expression, especially the telling of personal stories (Young 1996, 126).3 Speaking for an agonistic conception of democracy (to which Young also subscribes; 2000, 49–51), Mouffe states: To negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and aim at a universal rational consensus— that is the real threat to democracy. Indeed, this can lead to violence being unrecognized and hidden behind appeals to “rationality,” as is often the case in liberal thinking. (1996, 248) Mouffe is a radical pluralist: “By pluralism I mean the end of a substantive idea of the good life” (1996, 246). But neither Mouffe nor Young want to abolish communication in the name of pluralism and difference; much of their work advocates sustained attention to communication. Mouffe also cautions against uncritical celebration of difference, for some differences imply “subordination and should therefore be challenged by a radical democratic politics” (1996, 247). Mouffe raises the question of the terms in which engagement across difference might proceed. Participants should ideally accept that the positions of others are legitimate, though not as a result of being persuaded in argument. Instead, it is a matter of being open to conversion due to adoption of a particular kind of democratic attitude that converts antagonism into agonism, fighting into critical engagement, enemies into adversaries who are treated with respect. Respect here is notjust (liberal) toleration, but positive validation of the position of others. For Young, a communicative democracy would be composed of people showing “equal respect,” under “procedural rules of fair discussion and decisionmaking” (1996, 126). Schlosberg speaks of “agonistic respect” as “a critical pluralist ethos” (1999, 70). Mouffe and Young both want pluralism to be regulated by a particular kind of attitude, be it respectful, agonistic, or even in Young’s (2000, 16–51) case reasonable.Thus neither proposes unregulated pluralism as an alternative to (deliberative) consensus. This regulation cannot be just procedural, for that would imply “anything goes” in terms of the substance of positions. Recall thatMouffe rejects differences that imply subordination. Agonistic ideals demand judgments about what is worthy of respect and what is not. Connolly (1991, 211) worriesabout dogmatic assertions and denials of identity that fuel existential resentments that would have to be changed to make agonism possible. Young seeks “transformation of private, self-regarding desires into public appeals to justice” (2000, 51). Thus for Mouffe, Connolly, and Young alike, regulative principles for democratic communication are not just attitudinal or procedural; they also refer to the substance of the kinds of claims that are worthy of respect. These authors would not want to legislate substance and are suspicious of the content of any alleged consensus. But in retreating from “anything goes” relativism, they need principles to regulate the substance of what rightfully belongs in democratic debate.

#### Tailoring identity claims to common topics for deliberation is possible and desirable---the 1ac’s failure to affirm topical action impedes the culture of democratic debate that’s key to effective decisionmaking in a pluralistic society

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

MY RECENT BOOK, The Way We Argue Now, has in a sense two theses. In the first place, the book makes the case for the importance of debate and argument to any vital democratic or pluralistic intellectual culture. This is in many ways an unexceptional position, but the premise of the book is that the claims of reasoned argument are often trumped, within the current intellectual terrain, by appeals to cultural identity and what I gather more broadly under the rubric of ethos, which includes cultural identity but also forms of ethical piety and charismatic authority. In promoting argument as a universal practice keyed to a human capacity for communicative reason, my book is a critique of relativism and identity politics, or the notion that forms of cultural authenticity or group identity have a certain unquestioned legitimacy, one that cannot or should not be subjected to the challenges of reason or principle, precisely because reason and what is often called "false universalism" are, according to this pattern of thinking, always involved in forms of exclusion, power, or domination. My book insists, by contrast, that argument is a form of respect, that the ideals of democracy, whether conceived from a nationalist or an internationalist perspective, rely fundamentally upon procedures of argumentation and debate in order to legitimate themselves and to keep their central institutions vital. And the idea that one should be protected from debate, that argument is somehow injurious to persons if it does not honor their desire to have their basic beliefs and claims and solidarities accepted without challenge, is strenuously opposed. As is the notion that any attempt to ask people to agree upon processes of reason-giving argument is somehow necessarily to impose a coercive norm, one that will disable the free expression and performance of identities, feelings, or solidarities. Disagreement is, by the terms of my book, a form of respect, not a form of disrespect. And by disagreement, I don't mean simply to say that we should expect disagreement rather than agreement, which is a frequently voiced-if misconceived-criticism of Habermas. Of course we should expect disagreement. My point is that we should focus on the moment of dissatisfaction in the face of disagreement-the internal dynamic in argument that imagines argument might be the beginning of a process of persuasion and exchange that could end in agreement (or partial agreement). For those who advocate reconciling ourselves to disagreements rather than arguing them out, by contrast, there is a complacent-and in some versions, even celebratory-attitude toward fixed disagreement. Refusing these options, I make the case for dissatisfied disagreement in the final chapter of the book and argue that people should be willing to justify their positions in dialogue with one another, especially if they hope to live together in a post-traditional pluralist society. One example of the trumping of argument by ethos is the form that was taken by the late stage of the Foucault/Habermas debate, where an appeal to ethos-specifically, an appeal to Foucault's style of ironic or negative critique, often seen as most in evidence in the interviews, where he would playfully refuse labels or evade direct answers-was used to exemplify an alternative to the forms of argument employed by Habermas and like-minded critics. (I should pause to say that I provide this example, and the framing summary of the book that surrounds it, not to take up airtime through expansive self-reference, but because neither of my respondents provided any contextualizing summary of the book's central arguments, though one certainly gets an incremental sense of the book's claims from Bruce Robbins. Because I don't assume that readers of this forum have necessarily read the book, and because I believe that it is the obligation of forum participants to provide sufficient context for their remarks, I will perform this task as economically as I can, with the recognition that it might have carried more weight if provided by a respondent rather than the author.) The Foucauldian counter-critique importantly emphasizes a relation between style and position, but it obscures (1) the importance or value of the Habermasian critique and (2) the possibility that the other side of the debate might have its own ethos to advocate, one that has precisely to do with an ethos of argument, an ideal of reciprocal debate that involves taking distance on one's pre-given forms of identity or the norms of one's community, both so as to talk across differences and to articulate one's claims in relation to shared and even universal ideals. And this leads to the second thesis of the book, the insistence that an emphasis on ethos and character is interestingly present if not widely recognized in contemporary theory, and one of the ways its vitality and existential pertinence makes itself felt (even despite the occurrence of the kinds of unfair trumping moves I have mentioned). We often fail to notice this, because identity has so uniformly come to mean sociological, ascribed, or group identity-race, gender, class, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and so forth. Instances of the move toward character and ethos include the later Foucault (for whom ethos is a central concept), cosmopolitanism (whose aspiration it is to turn universalism into an ethos), and, more controversially, proceduralist ethics and politics (with its emphasis on sincerity and civility). Another version of this attentiveness to ethos and character appears in contemporary pragmatism, with its insistence on casualness of attitude, or insouciance in the face of contingency-recommendations that get elevated into full-fledged exemplary personae in Richard Rorty's notion of the "ironist" or Barbara Herrnstein Smiths portrait of the "postmodern skeptic." These examples-and the larger claim they support-are meant to defend theory as still living, despite the many reports of its demise, and in fact still interestingly and incessantly re-elaborating its relation to practice. This second aspect of the project is at once descriptive, motivated by the notion that characterology within theory is intrinsically interesting, and critical, in its attempt to identify how characterology can itself be used to cover or evade the claims of rational argument, as in appeals to charismatic authority or in what I identify as narrow personifications of theory (pragmatism, in its insistence on insouciance in the face of contingency, is a prime example of this second form). And as a complement to the critical agenda, there is a reconstructive agenda as well, an attempt to recuperate liberalism and proceduralism, in part by advocating the possibility, as I have suggested, of an ethos of argument. Robbins, in his extraordinarily rich and challenging response, zeroes in immediately on a crucial issue: who is to say exactly when argument is occurring or not, and what do we do when there is disagreement over the fundamentals (the primary one being over what counts as proper reasoning)? Interestingly, Robbins approaches this issue after first observing a certain tension in the book: on the one hand, The Way We Argue Now calls for dialogue, debate, argument; on the other, its project is "potentially something a bit stricter, or pushier: getting us all to agree on what should and should not count as true argument." What this point of entry into the larger issue reveals is a kind of blur that the book, I am now aware, invites. On the one hand, the book anatomizes academic debates, and in doing so is quite "debaterly" This can give the impression that what I mean by argument is a very specific form unique to disciplinary methodologies in higher education. But the book is not generally advocating a narrow practice of formal and philosophical argumentation in the culture at large, however much its author may relish adherence to the principle of non-contradiction in scholarly argument. I take pains to elaborate an ethos of argument that is linked to democratic debate and the forms of dissent that constitutional patriotism allows and even promotes. In this sense, while argument here is necessarily contextualized sociohistorically, the concept is not merely academic. It is a practice seen as integral to specific political forms and institutions in modern democracies, and to the more general activity of critique within modern societies-to the tradition of the public sphere, to speak in broad terms. Additionally, insofar as argument impels one to take distance on embedded customs, norms, and senses of given identity, it is a practice that at once acknowledges identity, the need to understand the perspectives of others, and the shared commitment to commonality and generality, to finding a way to live together under conditions of difference. More than this: the book also discusses at great length and from several different angles the issue that Robbins inexplicably claims I entirely ignore: the question of disagreement about what counts as argument. In the opening essay, "Debatable Performances," I fault the proponents of communicative ethics for not having a broader understanding of public expression, one that would include the disruptions of spectacle and performance. I return to and underscore this point in my final chapter, where I espouse a democratic politics that can embrace and accommodate a wide variety of expressions and modes. This is certainly a discussion of what counts as dialogue and hence argument in the broad sense in which I mean it, and in fact I fully acknowledge that taking distance from cultural norms and given identities can be advanced not only through critical reflection, but through ironic critique and defamiliarizing performance as well. But I do insist-and this is where I take a position on the fundamental disagreements that have arisen with respect to communicative ethics-that when they have an effect, these other dimensions of experience do not remain unreflective, and insofar as they do become reflective, they are contributing to the very form of reasoned analysis that their champions sometimes imagine they must refuse in order to liberate other modes of being (the affective, the narrative, the performative, the nonrational). If a narrative of human rights violation is persuasive in court, or in the broader cultural public sphere, it is because it draws attention to a violation of humanity that is condemned on principle; if a performance jolts people out of their normative understandings of sexuality and gender, it prompts forms of understanding that can be affirmed and communicated and also can be used to justify political positions and legislative agendas.

#### 3. Process Focus - Ignorance of strategic and tactical ends merely entrenches the status quo and denies other more progressive strategies – tactical disruptions are preferable to moral ones

Smith 2012 (Andrea, “The Moral Limits of the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement” settler colonial studies 2, 2 (2012) Special Issue: Karangatia: Calling Out Gender and Sexuality in Settler Societies)

Aside from Derrick Bell, because racial and gender justice legal advocates are so invested in the morality of the law, there has not been sustained strategising on what other possible frameworks may be used. Bell provides some possibilities, but does not specifically engage alternative strategies in a sustained fashion. Thus, it may be helpful to look for new possibilities in an unexpected place, the work of anti-trust legal scholar Christopher Leslie. Again, the work of Leslie may seem quite remote from scholars and activists organizing against the logics of settler colonialism. But it may be the fact that Leslie is not directly engaging in social justice work that allows him to disinvest in the morality of the law in a manner which is often difficult for those who are directly engaged in social justice work to do. This disinvestment, I contend is critical for those who wish to dismantle settler colonialism to rethink their legal strategies. In ‘Trust, Distrust, and Anti-Trust’, Christopher Leslie explains that while the economic impact of cartels is incalculable, cartels are also unstable.18 Because cartel members cannot develop formal relationships with each other, they must develop partnerships based on informal trust mechanisms in order to overcome the famous ‘prisoners’ dilemma’. The prisoner’s dilemma, as described by Leslie, is one in which two prisoners are arrested and questioned separately with no opportunity for communication between them. There is enough evidence to convict both of minor crimes for a one year sentence but not enough for a more substantive sentence. The police offer both prisoners the following deal: if you confess and implicate your partner, and your partner does not confess, you will be set free and your partner will receive a ten-year sentence. If you confess, and he does as well, then you will both receive a five-year sentence. In this scenario, it becomes the rational choice for both to confess because if the first person does not confess and the second person does, the first person will receive a ten-year sentence. Ironically, however, while both will confess, it would have been in both of their interests not to confess. Similarly, Leslie argues, cartels face the prisoners’ dilemma. If all cartel members agree to fix a price, and abide by this price fixing, then all will benefit. However, individual cartel members are faced with the dilemma of whether or not they should join the cartel and then cheat by lowering prices. They fear that if they do not cheat, someone else will and drive them out of business. At the same time, by cheating, they disrupt the cartel that would have enabled them to all profit with higher prices. In addition, they face a second dilemma when faced with anti-trust legislation. Should they confess in exchange for immunity or take the chance that no one else will confess and implicate them? Cartel members can develop mechanisms to circumvent pressures. Such mechanisms include the development of personal relationships, frequent communication, goodwill gestures, etc. In the absence of trust, cartels may employ trust substitutes such as informal contracts and monitoring mechanisms. When these trust and trust substitute mechanisms break down, the cartel members will start to cheat, thus causing the cartel to disintegrate. Thus, Leslie proposes, anti-trust legislation should focus on laws that will strategically disrupt trust mechanisms. Unlike racial or gender justice advocates who focus on making moral statements through the law, Leslie proposes using the law for strategic ends, even if the law makes a morally suspect statement. For instance, in his article, ‘Anti-Trust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability’, Leslie critiques the federal Anti-Trust’s 1993 Corporate Lenience Policy that provided greater incentives for cartel partners to report on cartel activity. This policy provided ‘automatic’ amnesty for the first cartel member to confess, and decreasing leniency for subsequent confessors in the order to which they confessed. Leslie notes that this amnesty led to an increase of amnesty applications.19 However, Leslie notes that the effectiveness of this reform is hindered by the fact that the ringleader of the cartel is not eligible for amnesty. This policy seems morally sound. Why would we want the ringleader, the person who most profited from the cartel, to be eligible for amnesty? The problem, however, with attempting to make a moral statement through the law is that it is counter-productive if the goal is to actually break up cartels. If the ringleader is never eligible for amnesty, the ringleader becomes inherently trustworthy because he has no incentive to ever report on his partners. Through his inherent trustworthiness, the cartel can build its trust mechanisms. Thus, argues Leslie, the most effective way to destroy cartels is to render all members untrustworthy by granting all the possibility of immunity. While Leslie’s analysis is directed towards policy, it also suggests an alternative framework for pursuing social justice through the law, to employ it for its strategic effects rather than through the moral statements it purports to make. It is ironic that an anti-trust scholar such as Leslie displays less ‘trust’ in the law than do many anti-racist/anti-colonial activists and scholars who work through legal reform.20 It also indicates that it is possible to engage legal reform more strategically if one no longer trusts it. As Beth Richie notes, the anti-violence movement’s primary strategy for addressing gender violence was to articulate it as a crime.21 because it is presumed that the best way to address a social ill is to call it a ‘crime’, this strategy is then deemed the correct moral strategy. When this strategy backfires and does not end violence, and in many cases increases violence against women, it becomes difficult to argue against this strategy because it has been articulated in moral terms. If, however, we were to focus on legal reforms chosen for their strategic effects, it would be easier to change the strategy should our calculus of its strategic effects suggest so. We would also be less complacent about the legal reforms we advocate as has happened with most of the laws that have been passed on gender violence. Advocates presume that because they helped pass a ‘moral’ law, then their job is done. If, however, the criteria for legal reforms are their strategic effects, we would then be continually monitoring the operation of these laws to see if they were having the desired effects. For instance, since the primary reason women do not leave battering relationships is because they do not have another home to go, what if our legal strategies shifted from criminalising domestic violence to advocating affordable housing? While the shift from criminalisation may seem immoral, women are often removed from public housing under one strike laws in which they lose access to public housing if a ‘crime’ (including domestic violence) happens in their residence, whether or not they are the perpetrator. If our goal was actually to keep women safe, we might need to creatively rethink what legal reforms would actually increase safety.

### 2

#### The aff’s presentation of suffering creates a marketplace of trauma transforming wounds into a commodity for western consumption. Their reductionism of native suffering exists by turning the other into a faceless object through which we can construct a sentimental economy of pleasure and pacification. The aff is a form of empathetic identification which is a process of deathmaking which ensures the smooth functioning of imperialism.

Berlant 1999 [Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and Politics” in *Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law* ed. Sarat and Kearns, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Pg. 49-54]

Ravaged wages and ravaged bodies saturate the global marketplace in which the United States seeks desperately to compete "competitively," as the euphemism goes, signifying a race that will be won by the nations whose labor conditions are most optimal for profit.2 In the United States the media of the political public sphere regularly register new scandals of the proliferating sweatshop networks "at home" and "abroad," which has to be a good thing, because it produces feeling and with it something at least akin to consciousness that can lead to action) Yet, even as the image of the traumatized worker proliferates, even as evidence of exploitation is found under every rock or commodity, it competes with a normative/utopian image of the US. citizen who remains unmarked, framed, and protected by the private trajectory of his life project, which is sanctified at the juncture where the unconscious meets history: the American Dream.4 In that story one's identity is borne of suffering, mental, physical, or economic. If the US worker is lucky enough to live at an economic moment that sustains the Dream, he gets to appear at his least national when he is working and at his most national at leisure, with his family or in semipublic worlds of other men producing surplus manliness (e.g., via sports). In the American dreamscape his identity is private property, a zone in which structural obstacles and cultural differences fade into an ether of prolonged, deferred, and individuating enjoyment that he has earned and that the nation has helped him to earn. Meanwhile, exploitation only appears as a scandalous nugget in the sieve of memory when it can be condensed into an exotic thing of momentary fascination, a squalor of the bottom too horrible to be read in its own actual banality. The exposed traumas of workers in ongoing extreme conditions do not generally induce more than mourning on the part of the state and the public culture to whose feeling-based opinions the state is said to respond. Mourning is what happens when a grounding object is lost, is dead, no longer living (to you). Mourning is an experience of irre¬ducible boundedness: I am here, I am living, he is dead, I am mourning. It is a beautiful, not sublime, experience of emancipation; mourning supplies the subject the definitional perfection of a being no longer in flux. It takes place over a distance: even if the object who induces the feeling of loss and helplessness is neither dead nor at any great distance from where you are.5 In other words, mourning can also be an act of aggression, of social deathmaking: it can perform the evacuation of sig-nificance from actually-existing subjects. Even when liberals do it, one might say, "others" are ghosted for a good cause.6 The sorrow songs of scandal that sing of the exploitation that is always "elsewhere" (even a few blocks away) are in this sense aggressively songs of mourning. Play them backward, and the military march of capitalist triumphalism (The Trans-Nationale) can be heard. Its lyric, currently crooned by every organ of record in the United States, is about necessity. It exhorts citi-zens to understand that the "bottom line" of national life is neither utopia nor freedom but survival, which can only be achieved by a citi-zenry that eats its anger, makes no unreasonable claims on resources or control over value, and uses its most creative energy to cultivate inti¬mate spheres while scrapping a life together flexibly in response to the market world's caprices. In this particular moment of expanding class unconsciousness that looks like consciousness emerges a peculiar, though not unprecedented, hero: the exploited child. If a worker can be infanfilized, pic-tured as young, as small, as feminine or feminized, as starving, as bleeding and diseased, and as a (virtual) slave, the righteous indigna-tion around procuring his survival resounds everywhere. The child must not be sacrificed to states or to profiteering. His wounded image speaks a truth that subordinates narrative: he has not "freely" chosen his exploitation; the optimism and play that are putatively the right of childhood have been stolen from him. Yet only "voluntary" steps are ever taken to try to control this visible sign of what is ordinary and sys¬temic amid the chaos of capitalism, in order to make its localized night¬mares seem uninevitable. Privatize the atrocity, delete the visible sign, make it seem foreign. Return the child to the family, replace the children with adults who can look dignified while being paid virtually the same revolting wage. The problem that organizes so much feeling then regains livable proportions, and the uncomfortable pressure of feeling dissipates, like so much gas. Meanwhile, the pressure of feeling the shock of being uncomfort-ably political produces a cry for a double therapy-4o the victim and the viewer. But before "we" appear too complacently different from the privileged citizens who desire to caption the mute image of exotic suf¬fering with an aversively fascinated mourning (a desire for the image to be dead, a ghost), we must note that this feeling culture crosses over into other domains, the domains of what we call identity politics, where the wronged take up voice and agency to produce transformative testimony, which depends on an analogous conviction about the self-evidence and therefore the objectivity of painful feeling The central concern of this essay is to address the place of painful feeling in the making of political worlds. In particular, I mean to challenge a powerful popular belief in the positive workings of something I call national sentimentality, a rhetoric of promise that a nation can be built across fields of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy. Sentimental politics generally promotes and maintains the hegemony of the national identity form, no mean feat in the face of continued widespread intercultural antagonism and economic cleavage. But national sentimentality is more than a current of feeling that circulates in a political field: the phrase describes a long¬standing contest between two models of U.S. citizenship. In one, the classic model, each citizen's value is secured by an equation between abstractness and emancipation: a cell of national identity provides juridically protected personhood for citizens regardless of anything specific about them. In the second model, which was initially organized around labor, feminist, and antiracist struggles of the nineteenth-cen¬tury United States, another version of the nation is imagined as the index of collective life. This nation is peopled by suffering citizens and noncitizens whose structural exclusion from the utopian-American dreamscape exposes the state's claim of legitimacy and virtue to an acid wash of truth telling that makes hegemonic disavowal virtually impos¬sible, at certain moments of political intensity. Sentimentality has long been the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced, in the dominant public sphere, as the true core of national collectivity. It operates when the pain of intimate others burns into the conscience of classically privileged national subjects, such that they feel the pain of flawed or denied citizenship as their pain. Theo¬retically, to eradicate the pain those with power will do whatever is necessary to return the nation once more to its legitimately utopian odor. Identification with pain, a universal true feeling, then leads to structural social change. In return, subalterns scarred by the pain of failed democracy will reauthorize universalist notions of citizenship in the national utopia, which involves believing in a redemptive notion of law as the guardian of public good. The object of the nation and the law in this light is to eradicate systemic social pain, the absence of which becomes the definition of freedom. Yet, since these very sources of protection—the state, the law, patriotic ideology—have traditionally buttressed traditional matrices of cultural hierarchy, and since their historic job has been to protect universal subject/citizens from feeling their cultural and corporeal specificity as a political vulnerability, the imagined capacity of these institutions to assimilate to the affective tactics of subaltern counterpolitics suggests some weaknesses, or misrecognitions, in these tactics. For one thing, it may be that the sharp specificity of the traumatic model of pain implicitly mischaracterizes what a person is as what a person becomes in the experience of social negation; this model also falsely promises a sharp picture of structural violence's source and scope, in turn promoting a dubious optimism that law and other visible sources of inequality, for example, can provide the best remedies for their own taxonomizing harms. It is also possible that counterhegemonic deploy-ments of pain as the measure of structural injustice actually sustain the utopian image of a homogeneous national metaculture, which can look like a healed or healthy body in contrast to the scarred and exhausted ones. Finally, it might be that the tactical use of trauma to describe the effects of social inequality so overidentifies the eradication of pain with the achievement of justice that it enables various confusions: for instance, the equation of pleasure with freedom or the sense that changes in feeling, even on a mass scale, amount to substantial social change. Sentimental politics makes these confusions credible and these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the centrality of inter-personal identification and empathy to the vitality and viability of col-lective life. This gives citizens something to do in response to over-whelming structural violence. Meanwhile, by equating mass society with that thing called "national culture," these important transpersonal linkages and intimacies all too frequently serve as proleptic shields, as ethically uncontestable legitimating devices for sustaining the hege¬manic field.9

#### Their arguments about cultural genocide represent sentimental attachments to a future where the intimate spaces of culture are preserved.

Smith 2010 [Andrea, department of media and cultural studies at UC-Riverside, “Queer Theory and Native Studies: The Heteronormativity of Settler Colonialism,” *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies* 16.1-2]

Within Native studies, many intellectual projects call on Native peoples to "decolonize" the academy as well as society at large.18 As I discuss below, the project of decolonization makes an important intervention into queer theory. But in this section, I look at how decolonizing political and intellectual work can benefit from a subjectless critique. Already, Native feminist works have complicated the politics of decolonization by noting that Native women are often marginalized within these projects.19 But the subjectless critique of queer theory further interrogates some of the problematic logics within much decolonization discourse by revealing how this discourse often reinstantiates rather than challenges colonial formations and ideologies. Lauren Berlant demonstrates how decolonization projects can become unwittingly implicated in perpetuating colonization in her theorization of the "infantile citizen."20 She argues that U.S. politics is often directed toward protecting the future incipient citizen, such as the child or the fetus. By directing our energies toward the future citizen, we then feel justified in instituting repressive policies that oppress today's citizens because these policies will supposedly protect [End Page 45] the innocent citizens of the future. An example Berlant points to is the criminalization of abortion that oppresses women today in order to protect tomorrow's children. This idea of reproductive continuity as homophobia is further taken up by Lee Edelman, who articulates the Child as the anchor for reproductive futurity. "For politics, however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt to produce a more desirable social order, remains, at its core, conservative insofar as it works to affirm a structure, to authenticate social order, which it then intends to transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child. That Child remains the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political intervention."21 He contends that "queerness names the side of those not 'fighting for the children,' the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism."22 Edelman makes an important critique of how the investment in the future justifies contemporary oppression. Fighting for the future can impel us to reproduce the current social order as it is. Thus Edelman is offering a potentially radical critique of organizing that can be akin to a revolution without guarantees: an antinormativizing of political struggle that challenges how social norms are being reproduced at every turn. This analysis could cohere with Judith Butler's critique of origin stories. Butler demonstrates how the past is mobilized to support contemporary oppressive political regimes in the way the future is similarly mobilized under Edelman's framework. Butler critiques theorists who posit a naturalized prediscursive sexed body as the foundation by which to critique contemporary heteropatriarchal practices. She argues that theorizing a prediscursive body necessarily means that the body cannot be prediscursive, since its account takes place within a discursive economy, and hence its account cannot be made outside prevailing power relations within its discursive economy. But positing the body as prediscursive allows the theorist to disavow her or his political investments because the theorist is supposedly rendering an account of the body prior to power relations. Butler's critique could then be more broadly applied to a critique of "origin stories." That is, when we critique a contemporary context through an appeal to a prior state before "the fall," we are necessarily masking power relations through evoking lost origins. "The self-justification of a repressive . . . law almost always grounds itself in a story about what it was like before the advent of the law. . . . The fabrication of those origins . . . thereby justifies, the Constitution of the law . . . making the constitution of the law appear as a historical inevitability."23 Butler's analysis of "origin stories," in conversation with Jennifer Denetdale's critique of Native tradition, demonstrates how the appeal to "tradition" often serves as the origin story that buttresses heteropatriarchy and other forms of oppression with Native communities [End Page 46] while disavowing its political investments.24 In her critique of antiblack racism, homophobia, and U.S. patriotism within Native communities, Denetdale argues that Native communities often support Christian Right ideologies in the name of tradition. Edelman's critique of futurity could add to Denetdale's critique of tradition by assessing how organizing for the "seventh generation" coalesces with uncritical uses of tradition to ensure that Native communities reproduce the colonial status quo with its attendant heteropatriarchy. Thus normative futurity depends on an "origin story." The future is legitimated as a continuation of the past. Here I am reminded of how I have often heard Native activists say, "Let us not work on domestic or other forms of gender violence now, we must work on survival issues first."25 Of course, since Native women are the women most likely to be killed by acts of gender violence in the United States, they are clearly not surviving. The many works on Native women and feminism that say that we are "American Indian women in that order," that position gender justice as something to be addressed after decolonization, all speak to how this politics of futurity sacrifices the lives of women and those who are not gender normative for the indefinitely postponed postcolonial future. As Denetdale notes, the Native nationhood that becomes articulated under this strategy of futurity is one that supports heteropatriarchy, U.S. imperialism, antiblack racism, and capitalism. As Edelman states: "Political programs are programmed to reify difference and thus to secure in the form of the future, the order of the same."26 Edelman calls us to queer "social organization as such" to show how our efforts to secure a better future for our children lead us to excuse injustice in the present.27

#### Debate exacerbates these problems: the ballot writes suffering into identity and institutionalizes identity politics’ dependence on suffering. Because debate already occurs against the backdrop of oppression, privilege, and suffering, the ballot can only ever be a vehicle for revenge. The alternative should change the frame from “I am” to “I want”.

Brown 1995 [Wendy, Professor of Political Science at Berkeley, States of Injury, pp. 66-74]

Liberalism contains from its inception a generalized incitement to what Nietzsche terms ressentiment, the moralizing revenge of the powerless, "the triumph of the weak as weak. "22 This incitement to ressentiment inheres in two related constitutive paradoxes of liberalism: that between individual liberty and social egalitarianism, a paradox which produces failure turned to recrimination by the subordinated, and guilt turned to resentment by the "successful"; and that between the individualism that legitimates liberalism and the cultural homogeneity required by its commitment to political universality, a paradox which stimulates the articulation of politically significant differences on the one hand, and the suppression of them on the other, and which offers a form of articulation that presses against the limits of universalist discourse even while that which is being articulated seeks to be harbored within-included in-the terms of that universalism. Premising itself on the natural equality of human beings, liberalism makes a political promise of universal individual freedom in order to arrive at social equality, or achieve a civilized retrieval of the equality postulated in the state of nature. It is the tension between the promises of individualistic liberty and the requisites of equality that yields ressentiment in one of two directions, depending on the way in which the paradox is brokered. A strong commitment to freedom vitiates the fulfillment of the equality promise and breeds ressentiment as welfare state liberalism--attenuations of the unmitigated license of the rich and powerful on behalf of the "disadvantaged." Conversely, a strong commitment to equality, requiring heavy state interventionism and economic redistribution, attenuates the commitment to freedom and breeds ressentiment expressed as neoconservative anti-statism, racism, charges of reverse racism, and so forth. However, it is not only the tension between freedom and equality but the prior presumption of the self-reliant and self-made capacities of liberal subjects, conjoined with their unavowed dependence on and construction by a variety of social relations and forces, that makes all liberal subjects, and not only markedly disenfranchised ones, vulnerable to ressentiment: it is their situatedness within power, their production by power, and liberal discourse's denial of this situatedness and production that cast the liberal subject into failure, the failure to make itself in the context of a discourse in which its self-making is assumed, indeed, is its assumed nature. This failure, which Nietzsche calls suffering, must either find a reason within itself (which redoubles the failure) or a site of external blame upon which to avenge its hurt and redistribute its pain. Here is Nietzsche's account of this moment in the production of ressentiment: For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering, more exactly, an agent; still more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering--in short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy .... This ... constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengefulness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects... to deaden, by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all.23 Ressentiment in this context is a triple achievement: it produces an affect (rage, righteousness) that overwhelms the hurt; it produces a culprit responsible for the hurt; and it produces a site of revenge to displace the hurt (a place to inflict hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). Together these operations both ameliorate (in Nietzsche's term, "anaesthetize") and externalize what is otherwise "unendurable." In a culture already streaked with the pathos of ressentiment for the reasons just discussed, there are several distinctive characteristics of late modern postindustrial societies that accelerate and expand the conditions of its production. My listing will necessarily be highly schematic: First, the phenomenon William Connolly names "increased global contingency" combines with the expanding pervasiveness and complexity of domination by capital and bureaucratic state and social networks to create an unparalleled individual powerlessness over the fate and direction of one's own life, intensifying the experiences of impotence, dependence, and gratitude inherent in liberal capitalist orders and constitutive of ressellfiment.24 Second, the steady desacralization of all regions of life--what Weber called disenchantment, what Nietzsche called the death of god-would seem to add yet another reversal to Nietzsche's genealogy of ressentiment as perpetually available to "alternation of direction." In Nietzsche's account, the ascetic priest deployed notions of "guilt, sin, sinfulness, depravity, damnation" to "direct the ressentiment of the less severely afflicted sternly back upon themselves ... and in this way exploited the bad instincts of all sufferers for the purpose of self-discipline, self-surveillance, and self-overcoming. "25 However, the desacralizing tendencies of late modernity undermine the efficacy of this deployment and turn suffering's need for exculpation back toward a site of external agency26 Third, the increased fragmentation, if not disintegration, of all forms of association not organized until recently by the commodities market-communities, churches, families-and the ubiquitousness of the classificatory, individuating schemes of disciplinary society, combine to produce an utterly unrelieved individual, one without insulation from the inevitable failure entailed in liberalism's individualistic construction. 27 ln short, the characteristics of late modern secular society, in which individuals are buffeted and controlled by global configurations of disciplinary and capitalist power of extraordinary proportions, and are at the same time nakedly individuated, stripped of reprieve from relentless exposure and accountability for themselves, together add up to an incitement to ressentiment that might have stunned even the finest philosopher of its occasions and logics. Starkly accountable yet dramatically impotent, the late modern liberal subject quite literally seethes with ressentiment11. Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and reaction to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning Nietzsche ascribed to it: namely, an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in reaction-the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics for deeds-and he suggests that not only moral systems but identities themselves take their bearings in this reaction. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche's thought: Identity ... does not consist of an active component, but is reaction to something outside; action in itself, with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then become something evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world. Hence any attempt to escape that pain will merely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures. 28 If the "cause" of ressentiment is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworking of this pain into a negative form of action, the "imaginary revenge" of what Nietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds. "29 This revenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does"30 (accomplished especially through the production of guilt), through the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege,·· as we say today) as self-recriminating, as its own indictment in a culture of suffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery. "'1 But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressentiment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection. This investment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recognition predicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfactions of revenge, which ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alternately denies the very possibility of these things and blames those who experience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverse without subverting this blaming structure: they do not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal individualism presupposes, nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes. Thus, politicized identity that presents itself as a self-affirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile external world." Insofar as what Nietzsche calls slave morality produces identity in reaction to power, insofar as identity rooted in this reaction achieves its moral superiority by reproaching power and action themselves as evil, identity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence, even while it seeks to assuage the pain of its powerlessness through its vengeful moralizing, through its wide distribution of suffer-through its reproach of power as such. Politicized identity, premised on exclusion and fueled by the humiliation and suffering imposed by its historically structured impotence in the context of a discourse of sover- eign individuals, is as likely to seek generalized political paralysis, to feast on generalized political impotence, as it is to seek its own or collective liberation through empowerment. Indeed, it is more likely to punish and reproach-"punishment is what revenge calls itself; with a hypocritical lie it creates a good conscience for itself"33\_than to find venues of self- affirming action.¶ But contemporary politicized identity's desire is not only shaped by the extent to which the sovereign will of the liberal subject, articulated ever more nakedly by disciplinary individuation and capitalist disinternments, is dominated by late-twentieth-century configurations of political and economic powers. It is shaped as well by the contemporary problematic of history itself, by the late modern rupture of history as a narrative, as ended because it has lost its end-a rupture that paradoxically gives history an immeasurable weight. As the grim experience of reading Discipline and Punish makes clear, there is a sense in which the gravitational force of history is multiplied at precisely the moment that history's narrative coherence and objectivist foundation is refuted. As the problematic of power in history is resituated from subject positioning to subject construction; as power is seen to operate spatially, infiltrationally, "microphysically" rather than only temporally, permeating every heretofore designated "interior" space in social lives and individuals; as eroding historical metanarratives take with them both laws of history and the futurity such laws purported to assure; as the presumed continuity of history is replaced with a sense of its violent, contingent, and ubiquitous force -history becomes that which has weight but no trajectory, mass but no coherence, force but no direction: it is war without ends or end. Thus, the extent to which "the tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living" is today unparalleled, even as history itself disintegrates as a coherent category or practice. We know ourselves to be saturated by history, we feel the extraordinary force of its and determinations; we are also steeped in a discourse of its insignificance, above all, we know that history will no longer (always already did not) act as our redeemer.¶ I raise the question of history because in thinking about late modern politicized identity's structuring by ressentiment, I have thus far focused on its foundation in the sufferings of a subordinated sovereign subject. Bur Nietzsche's account of the logic of ressentiment is also linked to that feature of the will that is stricken by history, that rails against time itself, that cannot "will backwards," that cannot exert its power over the past- either as a specific set of events or as time itself.¶ Willing liberates; but what is it that puts even the liberator himself in fetters? "It was"-that is the name of the will's gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy. Powerless against what has been done, he is an angry spectator of all that is past. . . . He cannot break time and time's covetousness, that is the will's loneliest melancholy.¶ Although Nietzsche appears here to be speaking of the will as such, Zarathustra's own relationship to the will as a "redeemer of history" makes clear that this "angry spectatorship" can with great difficulty be reworked as a perverse kind of mastery, a mastery that triumphs over the past by reducing its power, by remaking the present against the terms of the past-in short, by a project of self-transformation that arrays itself against its own genealogical consciousness. In contrast with the human ruin he sees everywhere around him-"fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents"-it is Zarathustra's own capacity to discern and to make a future that spares him from a rancorous sensibility, from crushing disappointment in the liberatory promise of his will:¶ The now and the past on earth-alas, my friends, that is what I find most unendurable; and l should not know how to live if I were not also a seer of that which must come. A seer, a willer, a creator, a future himself and a bridge to the future-and alas, also, as it were, a cripple at this bridge: all this is Zarathustra. ¶ Nietzsche here discerns both the necessity and the near impossibility- the extraordinary and fragile achievement-of formulating oneself as a creator of the future and a bridge to the future in order to appease the otherwise inevitable rancor of the will against time, in order to redeem the past by lifting the weight of it, by reducing the scope of its determinations. "And how could I bear to be a man if man were not also a creator and guesser of riddles and redeemer of accidents'" Of course, Zarathustra's exceptionality in what he is willing to confront and bear, in his capacities to overcome in order to create, is Nietzsche's device for revealing us to ourselves. The ordinary will, steeped in the economy of slave morality, devises means "to get rid of his melancholy and to mock his dungeon," means that reiterate the cause of the melancholy, that continually reinfect the narcissistic wound to its capaciousness inflicted by the past. "Alas," says Nietzsche, "every prisoner becomes a fool; and the imprisoned will redeems himself foolishly. "3" From this foolish redemption-foolish because it does not resolve the will's rancor but only makes a world in its image-is born the wrath of revenge: "that which was" is the name of the stone [the will] cannot move. And so he moves stones out of wrath and displeasure, and he wreaks revenge on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does. Thus the will, the liberator, took to hurting; and on all who can suffer he wreaks revenge for his inability to go backwards. This . . is what revenge is: the will's ill will against time and its ‘it was’. "?•9 Revenge as a "reaction," a substitute for the capacity to act, produces identity as both bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the present which embodies that history. The will that "took to hurting'' in its own impotence against its past becomes (in the form of an identity whose very existence is due to heightened consciousness of the immovability of its "it was," its history of subordination) a will that makes not only a psychological but a political practice of revenge, a practice that reiterates the existence of an identity whose present past is one of insistently irredeemable injury. This past cannot be redeemed unless the identity ceases to be invested in it, and it cannot cease to be invested in it without giving up its identity as such, thus giving up its economy of avenging and at the same time perpetuating its hurt-"when he then stills the pain of the wound he at the same time infects that wound. "40 In its emergence as a protest against marginalization or subordination, politicized identity thus becomes attached to its own exclusion both because it is premised on this exclusion for its very existence as identity and because the formation of identity at the site of exclusion, as exclusion, augments or "alters the direction of the suffering" entailed in subordination or marginalization by finding a site of blame for it. But in so doing, it installs its pain over its unredeemed history in the very foundation of its political claim, in its demand for recognition as identity. In locating a site of blame for its powerlessness over its past-a past of injury, a past as a hurt will-and locating a "reason" for the "unendurable pain" of social powerlessness in the present, it converts this reasoning into an ethicizing politics, a politics of recrimination that seeks to avenge the hurt even while it reaffirms it, discursively codifies it. Politicized identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold out no future-for itself or others-that triumphs over this pain. The loss of historical direction, and with it the loss of futurity characteristic of the late modern age, is thus homologically refigured in the structure of desire of the dominant political expression of the age: identity politics. In the same way, the generalized political impotence produced by the ubiquitous yet discontinuous networks of late modern political and economic power is reiterated in the investments of late modern democracy’s primary oppositional political formations.

### Case

**The affirmative’s focus on personal narratives and experiences creates a therapeutic model of debate that merely counsels the individual victims of oppression. This locates the cause of problems and solutions within the self, which invites political inaction and leaves structural causes of oppression untouched as long as we have adopted their method. This effectively absolves intellectuals of responsibility for racism while allowing it to thrive.**

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(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

**Approaching public controversies through a conversational model informed by therapy** also **enables political inaction** in two respects. First, **an open-ended process lacking mechanisms for closure thwarts progress toward resolution.** As Freeman writes of consciousness raising, **an unstructured, informal discussion** [End Page 418] **"leaves people with no place to go and** the lack of structure leaves them with **no way of getting there."**70 Second, **the** therapeutic **impulse to emphasize the self as both problem and solution ignores structural impediments constraining individual agency.** "**Therapy**," Cloud argues, "**offers consolation rather than compensation, individual adaptation rather than social change, and an experience of politics that is impoverished in its isolation from structural critique and collective action.**" Public **discourse emphasizing healing and coping**, she claims, "**locates** blame and **responsibility for solutions in the private sphere.**"71¶ **Clinton's Conversation on Race** not only **exemplified the** frequent **wedding of public dialogue and therapeutic themes but also illustrated the failure of a conversation-as-counseling model to achieve meaningful social reform.** In his speech inaugurating the initiative, Clinton said, "Basing our self-esteem on the ability to look down on others is not the American way . . . Honest dialogue will not be easy at first . . . Emotions may be rubbed raw, but we must begin." Tempering his stated goal of "concrete solutions" was the caveat that "power cannot compel" racial "community," which "can come only from the human spirit."72¶ **Following the president's cue to self-disclose emotions, citizens** chiefly **aired personal experiences and perspectives during** the **various community dialogues.** In keeping with their talk-show formats, **the forums showcased** what Orlando Patterson described as **"performative 'race' talk,"** "public speech acts" of denial, proclamation, defense, exhortation, and even apology, in short, **performances of "self" that left little room for productive public argument.**73 **Such personal evidence overshadowed the "facts" and "realities"** Clinton also had promised to explore, **including, for example, statistics on discrimination patterns in employment, lending, and criminal justice or expert testimony on cycles of dependency, poverty, illegitimacy, and violence.**¶ **Whereas Clinton had encouraged "honest dialogue"** in the name of "responsibility" and "community," **Burke argues that "The Cathartic Principle" often produces the reverse. "[C]onfessional,"** he writes, **"contains in itself a kind of 'personal irresponsibility,' as we may even relieve ourselves of private burdens by befouling the public medium."** More to the point, "**a thoroughly 'confessional' art may enact a kind of 'individual salvation at the expense of the group,'" performing a "sinister function, from the standpoint of overall-social necessities."**74 **Frustrated observers of the racial dialogue—many of them African Americans—echoed Burke's concerns.** Patterson, for example, noted, "when a young Euro-American woman spent nearly five minutes of our 'conversation' in Martha's Vineyard . . . publicly confessing her racial insensitivities, she was directly unburdening herself of all sorts of racial guilt feeling. **There was nothing to argue about.**"75 Boston Globe columnist Derrick Z. **Jackson invoked** the game metaphor communication theorists often link to [End Page 419] skills in conversation,76 voicing **suspicion of a talking cure for racial ailments that included neither** exhaustive **racial data nor concrete goals.** **"The game,"** wrote Jackson, **"is to get 'rid' of responsibility for racism while doing nothing to solve it."**77

#### The idea that indigenous peoples live closer to nature romanticizes an essentialized image of the Native and robs them of agency.

Kuper 2003 [Adam, Department of Human Sciences at Brunel University, “The Return of the Native,” *Current Anthropology* 44.3]

Where hunters and nomadic herders are concerned, it may be argued that they represent not merely the first inhabitants of a country but the original human populations of the world. In a certain sense primitive, aboriginal, humankinds firstcomers, theirs is the natural state of humanity. If that is so, then perhaps it follows that their rights must take precedence. However, while Upper Paleolithic hunters and gatherers operated in a world of hunters, every contemporary community of foragers or herders lives in intimate association with settled farmers. In certain cases, including those of the Kalahari Bushmen and the Congo Pygmies, they interacted with farming neighbours for centuries, probably for at least a millennium, before the colonial period (see Wilmsen 1989a). Exchanges with farmers and traders are crucial for their economy, and their foraging activities are geared to this broader economic context. Moreover, the divide between a foraging and a farming way of life is not necessarily hard and fast. People may forage for some seasons, even some years, but fall back on other activities when times are tough. Alternatively, farmers may be driven back on foraging as a result of war or natural disasters. All this suggests that the way of life of modern hunters or herders may be only remotely related to that of hunters and herders who lived thousands of years ago. Furthermore, even where technologies are very simple, cultural traditions vary between regions rather than according to modes of gaining a livelihood. For example, Kalahari huntergatherers have more in common in their religious beliefs or kinship systems with neighbouring Khoi or Hottentot herders than with the Hadza of Tanzania or the Pygmies of the Ituri Forest in the Congo, many of whom lived until recently largely by foraging (see Barnard 1992). Several generationsin some cases many centuriesof European settlement have also greatly complicated the picture. Local ways of life and group identities have been subjected to a variety of pressures and have seldom, if ever, remained stable over the long term. It is nevertheless often assumed that each local native group is the carrier of an ancient culture. In familiar romantic fashion, this culture is associated with spiritual rather than with material values. It is unique and expresses the genius of a native people. To be sure, it is conceded (even angrily insisted) that the authentic culture may survive only in rural enclaves, since (again in good romantic style) native cultures are represented as being everywhere under threat from an intrusive material civilization associated with cities, with stock markets, and with foreigners. However, it is argued that the essence survives and can be nursed back to health if the resources are provided. The alternative is represented in the bleakest terms. The loss of culture is sometimes spoken of as a form of genocide. Even in less apocalyptic discourses it is taken for granted that a people that loses its culture has been robbed of its identity and that the diminution of cultural variation represents a significant loss for all humanity. BoutrosGhali accordingly insisted that the indigenouspeoples movement was not only about land or hunting rights. It was, even more fundamentally, concerned with culture and identity. Indeed, beyond the conventional list of individual human rights something new was at issue. Henceforth we realize that human rights cover not only individual rights, BoutrosGhali claimed, but also collective rights, historical rights. We are discovering the new human rights, which include, first and foremost, cultural rights . We might even say that there can be no human rights unless cultural authenticity is preserved (1994:13).6 (He did not consider the possibility that collective rights might undermine individual rights.) Finally, there is a strong ecological thread in the indigenouspeoples rhetoric. According to the dogma, hunters are in tune with nature in a way that the exploitative and greedy farmers are not (see Brody 2001; cf. Gill 1994 and Kehoe 1994). As BoutrosGhali summed up, in appropriately clichd language, It is now clearly understood that many indigenous people live in greater harmony with the natural environment than do the inhabitants of industrialized consumer societies (BoutrosGhali 1994:13). An eloquent statement of the naturalharmony thesis has been published recently by the anthropologist and activist Hugh Brody (2001), but he has chosen to focus on Canadas far north, where the way of life has been shaped for centuries by the international fur trade. Inuit commercial hunters flourished here, in time embracing the new technologies of hunting rifles, motorized sleighs, and radio communications, but this trade has been in decline for decades, and the consumer boycott of furs has made further inroads in the rump of the industry. Since the 1950s the Canadian government has implemented a policy of sedentarization. Today there are still a few parttime commercial hunters and, as elsewhere in North America, some men still hunt for recreation, but hunting is a marginal activity. Ethnographers have emphasized the continuing importance of what Stewart calls the imagery rather than the subsistence aspects of hunting (Stewart 2002:93; cf. Omura 2002). However, few could quarrel with Doraiss (1997:3) conclusion that Inuit society, in many respects, is as modern as its EuroAmerican counterpart. Some activists wish that the Inuit would take up hunting again and restore an ancient environmental balance, but such hopes are not justified by experience. The 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act created 12 Nativecontrolled profitmaking corporations, which now export resources to Japan and Korea. Recently the Inupiat of Alaskas North Slope have supported oil drilling on the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (although they are opposed by the Gwichin Indians). In Greenland, the Inuitled Home Rule government regards hunting as anachronistic and objectionable and favours the exploitation of nonrenewable resources (see Nuttall 1998).

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#### Fourth, their invocation of the suffering indigenous subject legitimizes the structures of liberalism by invoking shame as the universal axis around which the promises of abstract equality can rally.

Povinelli 1998 [Elizabeth, associate professor in the department of anthropology at the University of Chicago. “The State of Shame: Australian Multiculturalism and the Crisis of Indigenous Citizenship,” in *Critical Inquiry* 24.2]

Freed from specific struggles, the signifier indigenousness began to function as an aura, naturalizing any struggle or commodity desire to which it was attached. For instance, when the head of the Australian Chil- dren's Television Foundation accused U.S. broadcasters of a "sinister new form" of cultural colonialism, she troped a national counterinsurgency as indigenous and countercolonial.51 She did this at the cost of effacing the struggles of actually existing indigenous groups against ongoing state co lonialism, struggles themselves drawing on transnational discourses and institutions including North and South American indigenous move- ments. But, in doing so, she also demonstrated the elasticity of the notion of indigenousness and its function in naturalizing even those social struggles that are potentially detrimental to actually existing Aboriginal people. The High Court's claim in Mabo that the common law was shamed by its own racist history and an international gaze should be placed within the context of these other contemporary national mortifications of state, capital, and public and counterpublic realignments and struggles. In particular, we should pay attention to the justices' concern that the Australian common law be brought "up to date" with other "civilized" First World Euro-American nation-states that had long ago recognized the mutual compatibility of native title and the state's radical title (M, p. 18).52 At stake in Mabo is not simply a nation's shame at its past as a colo- nizer, but its shame at its potential future as an economically and cultur- ally colonized nation. Will the historical significance of the Australian nation be that it bore an impotent Western humanism, a barren liberal democracy, the only "white" nation on earth to be colonized because it was unable to produce wealth and status-"the good life"-for its cit- izens? When Mabo is placed in this context, native title appears as a fetish of national anxieties about the status, role, and future of the Australian nation and helps explain the widespread public debates resulting from the case. Native title condenses and stands in for Australian aspirations for First Worldness (symbolically white, Euro-American) on the margins of Euro-American and Asia-Pacific domination-the Aboriginal subject (indigenous blackness) standing as the material to be worked over for the nation to maintain its place in (Western) modernity. The court's use of the shamed Anglo-Celtic Australian fixed the ideal image of the nation as a white, First World, global player in the national imaginary. Mabo's politics of shame is not, however, simply a nightmare about the nation's marginality. Instead shame allows the law to perform the ad- justments necessary to recuperate its authority and values in a "postideo- logical," (post)colonial moment. By postideological I do not mean to suggest that capital and state relations are now transparent. Rather I mean to point to a characteristic of the contemporary moment, in which a feeling, shame, displaces issues and evidences of power, hegemony, and contra- diction. As Berlant argues, feeling politics is experienced as beyond ideol- ogy, mediation, and contestation. Shame's political pleasure, its sublime politics, lies in conjuring an experience "beyond ideology" in a moment saturated with ideological readjustments of state discrimination. When the court evoked a shamed nation whose redemption de- pended upon an acknowledgment of past wrongdoings, it accomplished what a mere change of law could not. It created a focal point beyond politics for both business and subaltern antagonists of the state and the law's multicultural project, the former who might see the project as too radical, the latter as too reformist. The fantasy of shame and reparation created an experience of intimacy-intimate holding, intimate under- standing, intimate knowledge-between those who control the access to and those excluded from critical rights. Right-wing business leaders, who opposed the decision, had little recourse but to return the court's own rhetoric as a preideological barometer of national well-being. So, for ex- ample, a coalition of business interests emphasized the shame of a white nation forced into an unnatural structural adjustment by a nonwhite co- alition of transnational and subaltern groups. Rather than manipulating other nations, as a true First World nation would, Australia was like those other nations in being controlled by international forces unknown.53 Sub- ordinate groups and the left, shocked by the public pseudo-recognition of their position, were seduced towards the headlights of the law. In other words, by deploying a weapon once effectively wielded by the weak (sub- alterns, colonial subjects, African American civil rights activists, feminists, gays and lesbians),54 those who controlled access to resources and rights were able to bind oppressed groups more tightly to the state and to look- ing to state law as the site from which a nondiscriminatory politics could proceed, thereby cohering a national collective will in the face of serious public and business apprehension. They did so not by refusing to accept the shame, but by embracing, foregrounding, and using it as a source of identification for their political projects. They did not simply trumpet the good of state law, but lamented its villainy, as if the state were not a part of its own institutionality. And in doing so they showed how institutions are claimed to have feelings and how these feeling institutions translate liberation struggles against them into their own legitimation.55

#### Liberalism represents endless violence in the name to destroy non-liberal ways of life.

Batur 7 [Pinar, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Sociology @ Vassar, *The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide*, Handbook of The Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 441-3]

War and genocide are horrid, and taking them for granted is inhuman. In the 21st century, our problem is not only seeing them as natural and inevitable, but even worse: not seeing, not noticing, but ignoring them. Such act and thought, fueled by global racism, reveal that racial inequality has advanced from the establishment of racial hierarchy and institutionalization of segregation, to the confinement and exclusion, and elimination, of those considered inferior through genocide. In this trajectory, global racism manifests genocide. But this is not inevitable. This article, by examining global racism, explores the new terms of exclusion and the path to permanent war and genocide, to examine the integrality of genocide to the frame-work of global antiracist confrontation. GLOBAL RACISM IN THE AGE OF “CULTURE WARS” Racist legitimization of inequality has changed from presupposed biological inferiority to assumed cultural inadequacy. This defines the new terms of impossibility of coexistence, much less equality. The Jim Crow racism of biological inferiority is now being replaced with a new and modern racism (Baker 1981; Ansell 1997) with “culture war” as the key to justify difference, hierarchy, and oppression. The ideology of “culture war” is becoming embedded in institutions, defining the workings of organizations, and is now defended by individuals who argue that they are not racist, but are not blind to the inherent differences between African-Americans/Arabs/Chinese, or whomever, and “us.” “Us” as a concept defines the power of a group to distinguish itself and to assign a superior value to its institutions, revealing certainty that affinity with “them” will be harmful to its existence (Hunter 1991; Buchanan 2002). How can we conceptualize this shift to examine what has changed over the past century and what has remained the same in a racist society? Joe Feagin examines this question with a theory of systemic racism to explore societal complexity of interconnected elements for longevity and adaptability of racism. He sees that systemic racism persists due to a “white racial frame,” defining and maintaining an “organized set of racialized ideas, stereotypes, emotions, and inclinations to discriminate” (Feagin 2006: 25). The white racial frame arranges the routine operation of racist institutions, which enables social and economic repro-duction and amendment of racial privilege. It is this frame that defines the political and economic bases of cultural and historical legitimization. While the white racial frame is one of the components of systemic racism, it is attached to other terms of racial oppression to forge systemic coherency. It has altered over time from slavery to segregation to racial oppression and now frames “culture war,” or “clash of civilizations,” to legitimate the racist oppression of domination, exclusion, war, and genocide. The concept of “culture war” emerged to define opposing ideas in America regarding privacy, censorship, citizenship rights, and secularism, but it has been globalized through conflicts over immigration, nuclear power, and the “war on terrorism.” Its discourse and action articulate to flood the racial space of systemic racism. Racism is a process of defining and building communities and societies based on racial-ized hierarchy of power. The expansion of capitalism cast new formulas of divisions and oppositions, fostering inequality even while integrating all previous forms of oppressive hierarchical arrangements as long as they bolstered the need to maintain the structure and form of capitalist arrangements (Batur-VanderLippe 1996). In this context, the white racial frame, defining the terms of racist systems of oppression, enabled the globalization of racial space through the articulation of capitalism (Du Bois 1942; Winant 1994). The key to understanding this expansion is comprehension of the synergistic relationship between racist systems of oppression and the capitalist system of exploitation. Taken separately, these two systems would be unable to create such oppression independently. However, the synergy between them is devastating. In the age of industrial capitalism, this synergy manifested itself imperialism and colonialism. In the age of advanced capitalism, it is war and genocide. The capitalist system, by enabling and maintaining the connection between everyday life and the global, buttresses the processes of racial oppression, and synergy between racial oppression and capitalist exploitation begets violence. Etienne Balibar points out that the connection between everyday life and the global is established through thought, making global racism a way of thinking, enabling connections of “words with objects and words with images in order to create concepts” (Balibar 1994: 200). Yet, global racism is not only an articulation of thought, but also a way of knowing and acting, framed by both everyday and global experiences. Synergy between capitalism and racism as systems of oppression enables this perpetuation and destruction on the global level. As capitalism expanded and adapted to the particularities of spatial and temporal variables, global racism became part of its legitimization and accommodation, first in terms of colonialist arrangements. In colonized and colonizing lands, global racism has been perpetuated through racial ideologies and discriminatory practices under capitalism by the creation and recreation of connections among memory, knowledge, institutions, and construction of the future in thought and action. What makes racism global are the bridges connecting the particularities of everyday racist experiences to the universality of racist concepts and actions, maintained globally by myriad forms of prejudice, discrimination, and violence (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Batur 1999, 2006). Under colonialism, colonizing and colonized societies were antagonistic opposites. Since colonizing society portrayed the colonized “other,” as the adversary and challenger of the “the ideal self,” not only identification but also segregation and containment were essential to racist policies. The terms of exclusion were set by the institutions that fostered and maintained segregation, but the intensity of exclusion, and redundancy, became more apparent in the age of advanced capitalism, as an extension of post-colonial discipline. The exclusionary measures when tested led to war, and genocide. Although, more often than not, genocide was perpetuated and fostered by the post-colonial institutions, rather than colonizing forces, the colonial identification of the “inferior other” led to segregation, then exclusion, then war and genocide. Violence glued them together into seamless continuity. Violence is integral to understanding global racism. Fanon (1963), in exploring colonial oppression, discusses how divisions created or reinforced by colonialism guarantee the perpetuation, and escalation, of violence for both the colonizer and colonized. Racial differentiations, cemented through the colonial relationship, are integral to the aggregation of violence during and after colonialism: “Manichaeism [division of the universe into opposites of good and evil] goes to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes” (Fanon 1963:42). Within this dehumanizing framework, Fanon argues that the violence resulting from the destruction of everyday life, sense of self and imagination under colonialism continues to infest the post-colonial existence by integrating colonized land into the violent destruction of a new “geography of hunger” and exploitation (Fanon 1963: 96). The “geography of hunger” marks the context and space in which oppression and exploitation continue. The historical maps drawn by colonialism now demarcate the boundaries of post-colonial arrangements. The white racial frame restructures this space to fit the imagery of symbolic racism, modifying it to fit the television screen, or making the evidence of the necessity of the politics of exclusion, and the violence of war and genocide, palatable enough for the front page of newspapers, spread out next to the morning breakfast cereal. Two examples of this “geography of hunger and exploitation” are Iraq and New Orleans.

### Case

#### The affirmative reifies essentialized notions of indigenous folks

Omura 2003 [Keiichi, Faculty of Language and Culture at Osaka University, a Reply to “The Return of the Native,” *Cultural Anthropology* 44.3]

Kuper tells us that essentialism is still one of the most crucial issues that we must address if we are to avoid making the same mistakes as the modern anthropology criticized by postmodern and postcolonial anthropology as a collaborator of colonialism. This is because, as is demonstrated in this article, although the indigenous peoples movement has certainly contributed to the public recognition of collective rights and empowerment of indigenous people, such as the establishment of Nunavut Territory in Canada, its theoretical and conceptual foundation is an essentialist ideology that creates and amplifies the differences among ethnic groups and thus exacerbates ethnic frictions. As Kuper suggests, we should not only criticize the theoretical foundation of essentialist ideology but also propose an alternative to it, for without some reformulation of culture and identity the primitive will be restored to life under the veil of the indigenous. How shall we begin to propose such an alternative? I think that a clue to this problem is suggested, although not clearly stated, in this article, especially in the discussion of the discrepancy between the reality of indigenous peoples and the basic premises of the indigenous peoples movement. Kuper examines the assumptions underlying the indigenous peoples movement, such as the premise that each indigenous group constitutes the original inhabitants of a country and is the carrier of an ancient culture in which humans live in harmony with nature, and concludes that these assumptions are open to serious challenge. In reality, contemporary indigenous groups have experienced continual sociocultural change in the course of the complicated modern history of humankindmigrating, merging, changing their languages, social organizations, and modes of subsistence, altering their allegiances, and influencing each other. No indigenous group has lived in complete isolation and kept its way of life unchanged since the beginning of humankind. In this sense, the society and culture of every contemporary indigenous group is a complex of various elements resulting from historical interactions that is still in the process of change. Nevertheless, as Kuper points out, in the political arena and the courts the definition of indigenous and the authentic images of indigenous peoples are based on the assumptions of ties of blood and soil derived from the EuroAmerican essentialist or nationalist ideology of culture and identity mentioned above, that is, constructed regardless of the reality of indigenous peoples societies. This discrepancy throws light on two aspects of the sociopolitical situations of indigenous peoples. First, it indicates that indigenous peoples are still subordinate to EuroAmerican society because it is that society that defines indigenousness and controls decision making on indigenous problems. At the same time, however, it indicates that indigenous peoples have the potential for redefining indigenousness. For example, as I have shown (Omura 2002), Inuit people continually redefine their ethnic imagery in everyday life in accordance with changing conditions in an effort to construct a positive ethnic identity. Through this redefinition, Inuitness as defined by Inuit people themselves allows the adoption of new customs, such as jig dancing, tea drinking, and even trapping and driving snowmobiles, all introduced as the result of contact with EuroAmerican society. Seal hunting with rifle and snowmobile, regarded as deviation from authentic tradition and criticized by environmentalists in the seal fur war (Wenzel 1991), has become tradition as defined by Inuit people. Moreover, some descendants of nonInuit identify themselves as Inuit and are recognized as such in their community because they were adopted and brought up by Inuit. According to Briggs (1997), furthermore, some halfqaplunaak (white)halfInuit elders are respected as Inuinnat (real Inuit) because their behavior conforms to Inuitness. Therefore, it may be said that the reality of indigenous peoples eludes definitions and imagery constructed in terms of EuroAmerican essentialist ideology, and the redefinitions of identity and culture that indigenous people continually execute in their everyday life erode the basis of that ideology even though they are still under its dominion. If this is so, then it is on the daily practice of indigenous peoples that we should focus.

## 1NR

NO CARDS